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Changes to UK Insolvency Rules in the Wake of Covid-19: A Much-
Needed Help for Businesses or an Unjustified Harm to the Rule of 
Law? 




The economic impact of the Covid-19 outbreak has triggered calls for emergency fiscal 
and legislative measures to address liquidity and legal problems in several areas of law. 
Some of these measures address specifically companies in financial distress and 
insolvency statutes. Among the proposed changes to the insolvency framework, the UK 
Government announced a suspension of wrongful trading provision as outlined in section 
significant amendments) in section 10 of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 
-month period 
or one month after the coming into force of the Bill, whichever is later.  
 
To assess the need for such a measure, this paper investigates the requirements to 
establish a successful claim for wrongful trading and the interpretation of those 
requirements, stemming from the case law. It also discusses the announced suspension 
as implemented by the Government in the Bill. This analysis strongly suggests that the 
suspension of (liability for) wrongful trading does nothing to achieve the purpose for which 
it was introduced, i.e. to facilitate business rescue and/or to help viable companies to 
survive the crisis created by the Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
To the contrary, the suspension of personal liability actions against the directors is likely to 
curb the rule of law in the UK. Laws are deferred and the exercise of civil liability remedies 
restricted without any apparent justification and with no proof that this measure is relevant 





The economic measures announced and implemented by the Government in the past few 
weeks to deal with the immediate and long-term consequences of the Covid-19 outbreak 
are broad-ranging.1 Some aim at keeping companies afloat by furloughing employees 
under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme,2 granting emergency loans, deferring VAT 
* This article covers statutes, literature and case law published before 1 June 2020. The usual disclaimer 
applies. The author is greatly indebted to Yseult Marique for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper, as well as to Panagiota Kotzamani and Lee Hansen for their constructive criticism of the manuscript. 
1 For an updated outline, see the report prepared by Sonya Van de Graaff (Morrison & Foerster (U.K.) LLP) 
for the World Bank and INSOL International, available here: <http://insol-
techlibrary.s3.amazonaws.com/c17d98a5-bb2a-4713-80d9-
54f43ebcecd1.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJA2C2IGD2CIW7KIA&Expires=1587279308&Signature=8%2B
EvPI5l5NrY3gYlM1mTdXZmWdg%3D> accessed 25 April 2020. 
2 Under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, companies can put their employees on furlough because 
of the restrictions on trade arising from the Covid-19 pandemic. In that case, the Government will pay 80 
 wages plus any employer National Insurance and pension contribution up to 
£2,500/month: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/claim-for-wages-through-the-coronavirus-job-retention-
scheme> accessed 25 April 2020. Unfortunately, despite the detrimental effect that this may cause for the 
possibility of rescuing the company in administration, the courts have held that if the employees remained 
payments and stopping the requirement to pay taxes on property leases.3 Others avoid 
that insolvency procedures are brought against companies that are only temporarily cash-
flow insolvent due to the Covid-19 outbreak.4  
 
On Saturday 28 March 2020, the Business Secretary, Alok Sharma, announced new 
insolvency measures to provide businesses with the flexibility and breathing space they 
need to continue trading during the Covid-19 crisis.5 This announcement later resulted in 
6 which is expected to be converted 
into law by the end of June 2020. The most prominent of the proposed changes to the 
insolvency framework are: 
 
1. A temporary suspension of liability for wrongful trading; 
2. A short automatic stay for companies giving them a breathing space from creditor 
action, whilst they seek rescue or restructure; 
3. Allowing companies continued access to their supplies; and 
4. A new restructuring plan which would be binding on all creditors and include a 
- 7 
 
This paper focuses on the announced suspension of wrongful trading provision as later 
implemented in the Bill. To assess the need for such a measure, this paper investigates 
the requirements to establish a successful claim for wrongful trading, taking into account 
the interpretation of those requirements established from the case law. This analysis 
suggests that suspension of (liability for) wrongful trading does nothing to allow directors 
to protect viable businesses struggling from the Covid-19 pandemic from vulture creditors.  
 
To the contrary, the suspension of personal liability actions against the directors has the 
effect of promoting abusive exercise of powers by directors, thus reducing the rule of law 
s creditors. 
furloughed and the administrators took no further action in relation to them, this would amount to adopting 
the employment contracts of these employees: Re Debenhams Retail ltd (in administration) [2020] EWCA 
Civ 600, [2020] Bus. L.R. 788, confirming [2020] EWHC 921 (Ch), [2020] 4 WLUK 158 (Powdrill v Watson 
[1995] 2 A.C. 394 followed). As a result, the employees are accorded a priority of entitlement to payment of 
any sums payable as wages or salary under their contract of employment, and these liabilities take 
 
3 See, for instance, the provisions made in the Coronavirus Act 2020 (which received Royal Assent on 25 
March 2020), preventing landlords from exercising a right of forfeiture of a relevant business tenancy 
(under Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954) for non-payment of rent between 25 March and 30 
June 2020 (a date which may be extended). 
4 See, for instance, the provisions in the Temporary Insolvency Practice Direction effective from 6 April 
2020, which adjourned all non-urgent insolvency applications and petitions listed for hearing prior to 21 
April 2020. Available here: <https://www.trinitychambers.co.uk/media/2654/temporary-ipd-april-2020_.pdf> 
para. 4, accessed 25 April 2020. 
5 The press release is available here: <https://www.gov.uk/Government/news/regulations-temporarily-
suspended-to-fast-track-supplies-of-ppe-to-nhs-staff-and-protect-companies-hit-by-covid-19> accessed 25 
April 2020. 
6 Corporate Insolvency and Governance HC Bill (2019-21). 
7 - sually, a restructuring plan 
can only be approved if the required majority of creditors vote in favour of it.  
If creditors are divided in classes, all classes need to reach the required majority but dissenting creditors 
within that class are out-voted by the other creditors within the same class.  
If cross-class cram down is allowed, dissenting classes of creditors can be out-voted provided that the 
other classes vote in favour of the restructuring plan. The cross-class cram down needs to be sanctioned 
by a court so long as it does not unfairly prejudice the dissenting class of creditors. 
 
II. Wrongful Trading under English Law  A Look at the Statutes 
 
The wrongful trading section of the Act applies whenever the company directors did not 
take appropriate actions and caused damage to the creditors by continuing to operate a 
company when they knew or ought to have known that the company had no reasonable 
prospects of avoiding insolvent liquidation or administration.8  
 
The introduction of a similar provision was strongly recommended by the Cork Report,9 as 
there was the perception that the burden of proof required to establish fraudulent trading 
(criminal liability) was too high to prevent the inappropriate behaviour of the directors.  
 
This section is without prejudice to sections 213 and 246ZA of the Act, which deal with 
fraudulent trading.10  
 
The petition can be submitted not only by the liquidators, but also by the administrators.11 
The consequences for the alleged perpetrator are not only to make a contribution to the 
assets of the company but also to be subject to disqualification proceedings.12  
 
To establish civil liability, the petitioner (administrator or liquidator) needs to demonstrate 
that: 
 
1. There was a specific moment in time before the director filed for liquidation or 
administration when the directors realised that a formal insolvency proceeding was 
 
2. The director, de facto director and shadow director13 knew or ought to have known 





is whether a director knew or ought to have known that there was no prospect of avoiding 
insolvent liquidation or administration if such outcome would be reached by: 
 
(a) Any director with general knowledge, skill and experience; and 
(b) The specific director, with his or her specific knowledge, skill and experience. 
 
If it is proven that the director continued trading after they knew or ought to have known 
that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent administration or liquidation, 
there is a case of wrongful trading.  
 
8 s.214(1) IA 1986. 
9 RJ Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP 2005); I Fletcher, The Law of 
Insolvency (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 835 at [27-034]. 
10 s.214(8) IA 1986. For more on this matter, see section III(a) of this paper. 
11 s.246ZB IA 1986. 
12 s.215(2) and (4) IA 1986. 
13 s.214(7) IA 1986.  
Directors can only escape liability for wrongful trading if they demonstrate  on the balance 
of probabilities  that they took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to 
14  
 
This preliminary analysis of the statutory requirements to establish a successful claim for 
wrongful trading suggests that directors would have a hard time in shielding themselves 
from such claims. The office holder needs only to establish that the debtor was 
approaching insolvency and the director continued trading, thus causing a financial loss to 
the creditors.  
 
 
business rescue and helps viable companies to survive the crisis created by the Covid-19 
pandemic. However, one should exercise caution when making such assumption, 
especially because  as mentioned before in this section  the directors remain liable for 
a multitude of other offences under the Act.   
 
provision stands up to scrutiny, when considered in light of how courts have interpreted 
this section of the Act and the statutory language in the Bill. 
 
III. Wrongful Trading under English Law  A Look at the Cases and at the Bill 
 
Law in books differs from law in practice. It is, therefore, appropriate to investigate how 
courts have implemented the statutory provision outlined in the earlier part of this paper 
and how the suspension of wrongful trading was translated into the Bill.  
 
a) Case Law 
 
In order to establish if a director is liable for breaching the wrongful trading provision, the 
courts consider the specific circumstances of the case. Particularly, they consider the 
companies run in the past by the director, the type of business and the profile (executive 
or non-executive) of the director.15  
 
Courts do not approach the question of whether a director ought to have concluded that a 
company had no reasonable prospect of avoiding liquidation with the benefit of hindsight, 
i.e. on the basis of ex post knowledge.16 
 
One of the most contentious points of the wrongful trading provision has always been the 
defence provided by section 214(3) of the Act. Directors can invoke this defence if they 
 
 
Proof that they have met the requisite conditions set out in section 214(3) can be reached 
if the director demonstrates that the continuation of trading was intended to reduce the net 
deficiency of the company and minimise the risk of loss to individual creditors.17  
14 S.214(3) IA 1986. 
15 Re Produce Marketing Consortium ltd (1989) 5 B.C.C. 569; Re Sherborne Associates ltd [1995] B.C.C. 
40; Re Bian D Pierson (Contractors) ltd [1999] B.C.C. 26. 
16 Re Ralls Builders ltd [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch), [2016] B.C.C. 293; Johnson v Beighton [2019] EWHC 895 
(Ch), [2019] 3 W.L.U.K. 380. 
17 Re Ralls Builders ltd [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch), [2016] B.C.C. 293. 
 
In Continental Assurance, the directors escaped liability because they reduced trading to 
minimal and cautious levels and filed for liquidation when they were advised that the 
company was insolvent.18 And, vice versa, the directors did not escape liability in Idessa, 
w and 
minimise the losses for the creditors.19  
 
While this defence in section 214(3) has been successfully invoked in the past, it is also 
undeniable that it had been construed strictly,20 in order to avoid making it too easy  for 
directors to escape liability. Additionally, courts have usually adopted a tough stance on 
directors.21  
 
decision to introduce a suspension to this provision is appropriate to ensure that viable 
companies continue trading over the Covid-19 crisis. A law tough on directors has been 
applied strictly by the courts. Law in books and law in practice seem not to differ, at least 
at first glance. 
 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that, even if the section 214(3) defence fails, courts have 
complete discretion as to whether to make an order and if so, on its content. For instance, 
in Nicholson 
liable for the losses caused by wrongful trading despite the fact that the applicant 
succeeded in proving the misconduct and the defendant failed in their defence. This is 
because the debtor was operating in challenging market conditions (the period following 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08), in a sector of the economy significantly affected by 
the said challenging conditions. Additionally, the directors constantly monitored and 
discussed the situation with key creditors.22 
 
roduce a suspension of 
this provision due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, there are other factors militating 
against the need to introduce such a suspension into the law.  
 
First, in any wrongful trading application, the applicants need to prove that the company 
had "no reasonable prospect" of avoiding insolvency. This represents a challenging and 
daunting task in the current economic and financial climate. At the time of writing, the 
Government announced that the lockdown should have remained in place for 3 weeks.23 
Subsequently the Government extended this period for another 3 weeks24 and it only on 
-19 
18 Re Continental Assurance Company of London plc [2001] B.P.I.R. 733. 
19 Re Idessa (UK) ltd [2011] EWHC 804 (Ch), [2011] B.P.I.R. 957. 
20 A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law. Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 662. 
21 See, among others, Palmer v Tsai [2017] EWHC 2710 (Ch), [2017] 9 W.L.U.K. 369, where the court 
refused to grant additional time to directors to file their defences as they had already failed to comply with 
previous court orders. 
22 Nicholson v Fielding [2017] 9 W.L.U.K. 260. 
23 On 23 March 2020, the Government announced measures to stem the coronavirus pandemic. These 
included a 'lockdown': citizens should now stay at home apart from essential travel or risk fines and all non-
essentia
The Guardian, 23 March 2020. 
24  
crisis.25 If directors do not know when their companies will be allowed to operate again in 
the market and under which conditions, they cannot assess if their companies have no 
reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation or administration. Hence, office 
holders cannot successfully promote a claim for wrongful trading against them. It follows 
that there is no apparent reason for the Government to suspend the enforceability of this 
section in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis. 
  
Other reasons militate against the introduction of a suspension of wrongful trading.  
 
Second, this suspension is not a panacea. Directors continue to be liable for the breach of 
the duties26 they have towards the creditors;27 fraudulent trading28 and transactions 
defrauding creditors;29 antecedent transactions which put assets beyond the reach of 
creditors;30 and misfeasance.31  
 
As the wrongful trading section is not the only means by which directors may incur personal 
liability for their actions, suspending this provision alone will not remove the risk of personal 
liability for directors. This in itself suggests that the announced protection against personal 
liability granted to directors by means of the suspension of wrongful trading is partial at 
best. 
 
Third, courts also retain discretion not only with reference to the wrongful trading order but 
also in determining if the company is cash-flow insolvent. The existence of a condition of 
insolvency or inability to pay its debts is a key issue for triggering a wrongful trading claim.  
 
On this latter point, in the seminal case of Cheyne Finance,32 the court held that they will 
date. In other words, English court
pay its debts is due to a temporary lack of liquidity soon to be remedied.33 This position 
was approved by the UK Supreme Court in Eurosail.34 
 
The Eurosail approach is being generally applied by the courts.35 As a result, it is nowadays 
the cash-flow test into a flexible and fact sensitive requirement to which balance-sheet 
insolvency is not irrelevant. The analysis of cash-flow insolvency shall not be carried out 
mechanistically but in a manner that has regard to commercial reality.36  
 
25 
The Independent,  23 April 2020. 
26 ss. 171-177 Companies Act 2006. 
27 
 
28 s.213 IA 1986. 
29 s.423 IA 1986. 
30 ss. 238-239 and 244-245 IA 1986. 
31 s.212 IA 1986. 
32 Re Cheyne Finance plc (No 2) [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch), [2008] Bus. L.R. 1562. 
33 Ibid [51]. 
34 BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2013] UKSC 28, [2013] 1 WLR 1408. 
35 Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch), [2014] BCC 337 [81]; Evans v Jones 
[2016] EWCA Civ 660, [2017] Ch. 1. 
36 Re Rococo Developments Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 660, [2017] Ch. 1, [24]. 
is a serious mat 37 and should be restricted to cases where rescue is possible38 and the 
debtor is more likely than not to be insolvent.39 
 
The third and fourth points reassert that  especially during the Covid-19 crisis  office 
holders will have a hard time to prove that the company had no reasonable prospects of 
avoiding insolvent liquidation or administration. This suggests, once again, the lack of 
justification to suspend wrongful trading. 
 
b) The Bill 
 
Despite the sensible approach adopted by courts in interpreting section 214 of the Act and 
the existence of other instances of personal liability in the Act, the Government thought it 
appropriate to introduce changes to the wrongful trading regime to avoid unnecessary 
insolvencies and allow distressed yet viable companies to continue trading during the 
crisis. Section III(a) demonstrated that this decision does not withstand academic scrutiny. 
It is yet to be assessed, however, whether the suspension provision affords directors the 
protection from wrongful trading actions which the Government intended to give. This 
section carries out this assessment with reference to the wording of the Bill. 
 
A close look at the provision in the Bill suggests that the announced measure presents 
several issues, particularly with reference to its scope which at times appears too narrow 
and other times too broad. 
 
The scope is arguably too narrow. Sections 10(3) and (4) of the Bill clarify that the 
suspension of liability for wrongful trading does not apply to a variety of companies. These 
include (among others) insurance companies, banks (including investment banks and 
firms), building societies, friendly societies, credit unions, public-private partnership project 
companies and overseas companies with corresponding functions. In other words, a lot of 
medium and large enterprises are excluded from the scope of this provision without any 
apparent justification. 
 
Additionally, the Government decided to waive the liability for wrongful trading, while 
section 214 of the Act continues to apply. Furthermore, the liability for wrongful trading for 
petitions but only for debt 
period.  
 
This means that a company can be admitted into insolvency proceedings as a result of the 
Covid-19 pandemic40 and directors can still be sued for breach of section 214 of the Act. 
As a result, petitioners can still hold directors liable for debt incurred before 1 March 2020 
if the criteria summarised above are met. 
37 Re Colt Telecom Plc (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2815 (Ch), [2003] BPIR 324 [24]. See also: Re Gigi Brooks ltd 
[2015] EWHC 961 (Ch), [2015] 2 W.L.U.K. 736, where the court declined to make an administration order 
because it could not be satisfied that the company was insolvent, either on a balance sheet or cash flow 
basis, or that the statutory purposes would be achieved. 
38 Re Arrows ltd No. 3 [1992] BCLC 555, dismissing a petition for administration because the majority of 
the creditors appeared to be against such an order, thus making it unlikely their approval of the 
 
39 Re Colt Telecom Plc (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2815 (Ch), [2003] BPIR 324 [25]. 
40 Exceptions and exclusions apply. 
 
Furthermore, the poor drafting quality of the Bill has the effect of further narrowing down 
the scope of the suspension. As a result, it is argued that directors may be held 
accountable for breach of wrongful trading provision even for debt incurred after 1 March 
2020 for the reasons outlined below. 
 
The Explanatory Notes seem to grant adequate protection to directors. They state that 
courts will not take into account losses incurred during the period in which businesses were 
suffering from the impact of the pandemic.41 This is not, however, reflected in the language 
used in the Bill. 
 
Section 10(1) of the Bill provides that the court is to assume that the person is not 
responsible for any worsening of the financial position of the company or its creditors that 
occurs during the 
the risk of an insolvency practitioner being able to rebut that assumption in the course of 
an action for wrongful trading. 
 
This raises a number of issues. For instance, does the presumption in section 10(1) of the 
Bill leave it open to an office holder to seek a contribution where they can, through 
evidence, demonstrate that the person was responsible for the worsening position? On the 
basis of the current draft of the Bill, the answer is likely going to be in the affirmative. 
 
The narrow scope of the suspension means that it does not apply with reference to some 
companies and  even with reference to the companies for which it applies  directors can 
still be held liable for losses incurred before and after 1 March 2020 as a result of wrongful 
trading. 
 
At the same time, the scope is too broad. First, the provision makes no reference to the 
pandemic.  Other temporary provisions in the Bill refer specifically to coronavirus for the 
purposes of determining their applicability. For instance, creditors are restricted from 
serving winding up petitions unless they demonstrated that Covid-19 has not had a 
financial effect on the debtor.42 This might be the case, for instant, of an insolvent grocery 
shop. 
 
However, there is no such qualification to the application of the suspension of liability for 
wrongful trading provision.  Both the Explanatory Notes and the Bill state that there is no 
worsening financial position was due to the Covid-
19 pandemic. The Bill adopts a blanket approach: liability for losses incurred in the relevant 
period is waived, irrespective of whether the losses are incurred because of the Covid-19 
pandemic. 
 
This blanket approach raises issues of potential abuse of the law if the office holders 
cannot hold the directors accountable for losses that are not caused by the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
 
For instance, the creditor of the above-mentioned insolvent grocery shop may be able to 
file an insolvency petition against their debtor. This petition is likely to be granted if the 
41 Explanatory Notes to the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 2019-21, para. 28. 
42 Section 2(2), Part 2, Schedule 10 of the Bill. 
debtor is insolvent for the reason mentioned above. Yet, the office holders may not be able 
to recover any losses caused by wrongful trading incurred in the relevant period because 
of the blanket approach of the Bill. This is even if the losses were not caused by the Covid-
19 pandemic, thus showing that the scope of the suspension is too broad here. 
 
Second, as stated in section III(a) of this paper, suspending liability for wrongful trading 
alone will not remove the risk of personal liability for directors. However, the other sections 
gratuitous transactions to the detriment of creditors. De facto, section 10 of the Bill 
introduces a general, too broad shield to personal liability for directors. 
 
Third, this extension is likely to last far longer than the three months originally envisaged 
by the Government. The Explanatory Notes state that, in the event that the impact of the 
pandemic on businesses continues beyond the end of that period, the measure may be 
extended for up to six months using secondary legislation. This process may be repeated, 
extending the suspension period further.43 
 
As a result of all these considerations, a measure in theory designed to remove the threat 
of the Covid-19 pandemic on businesses is likely to lift significant restrictions on the 
arbitrary exercise of powers by rogue directors, thus sign
(and the rule of law). 
 
c) Concluding Remarks 
 
Wrongful trading already has a relatively high barrier of proof, with very few cases ever 
taken forward. It already has safeguards which probably would, for most sensible directors, 
not leave them exposed to risk of personal liability in any given circumstance.  
 
In practice, English courts manage to successfully balance the need to adopt a tough 
stance on errant directors without unduly compressing their freedom and ability to make 
rescue attempts on the eve of insolvency. This is especially true whenever directors act 
under the expert advice of turnaround professionals and accountants.44 As a result, there 
is no need to introduce a suspension of wrongful trading. 
 
Section 10 of the Bill has altered this equilibrium, unless it is significantly amended as the 
Bill progresses through Parliament. On the one hand, in some instances this section does 
not offer protection to directors responsible for worsening of the debto
even if this happened after 1 March 2020 and because of the crisis. On the other, it has 
the potential of being abused by rogue directors because liability is suspended irrespective 
of whether the losses are caused by the pandemic. It is sufficient that these losses are 
incurred during the pandemic (or for a long period of time after 1 March 2020).  
 
45 for rogue 
directors who incurred excessive liabilities at the time of Covid-19. When applicable, it 
shields them from liability for losses caused by wrongful trading and not due to the Covid-
19 pandemic. 
43 Explanatory Notes to the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 2019-21, para 29. 
44 Re Continental Assurance Company of London plc [2001] B.P.I.R. 733. 






A person who is not expert in insolvency matters may be excused for thinking that the 
wrongful trading provision represents an unreasonable burden for directors at times of 
 
to save companies and, ultimately, jobs.  
 
not withstand academic scrutiny. This is because the suspension of liability for wrongful 
trading is poorly drafted and does not properly consider the law and the way in which courts 
have consistently interpreted section 214 of the Act.  
 
All these elements strongly suggest that t
goal to remove a deterrence to continue trading where there is a threat of insolvency. It 
produces, however, undesired side effects. As a result, the announced suspension of 
liability for wrongful trading may generate a plethora of abusive practices and raise rule-
of-  
 
 
  
